Bodycote Thermal Processing, Inc.: OSHA inspections and violations

Incident on Oct 18, 2011: Employee suffers burn from scalding water

On October 18, 2011, Employee #1, of Bodycote Thermal Processing Incorporated, w as performing duties of a maintenance supervisor. He needed to drain a clogged p ipe. Employee #1 loosened the collar of the clogged exit pipe that tightens the hose to the pipe fitting. Suddenly, the hose ejected off of the pipe and scalded him on the left side of his neck, shoulder, and his left arm. Employee # 1 was hospitalized and treated for second degree burns (due to the sudden release of h igh pressure water, steam, and black galvanized pipe residue), which included sk in grafts. The facility involved in the incident treats metal and employs approx imately 38 people. The machine involved in the incident was a continuous belt fu rnace (Number 70) manufactured by Mahler.

Incident on Aug 31, 2010: Employee receives laceration when struck by object within pi

On August 31, 2010, Employee #1, a maintenance mechanic, was working on the lowe ring system of a thermal processing pit. As he worked, a section of the system t hat he was repairing fell and struck him. He was knocked against the side of the 15 ft deep pit and received a 3.15 in. laceration. Employee #1 did not fall fur ther into the pit because he was wear a personal fall arrest system. He was tran sported to a medical center where he underwent medical care and was hospitalized .

Incident on Dec 5, 2006: Employee falls to lower level and suffers fractured ribs

At approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 5, 2006, Employee #1 was standing on a pl ywood platform making adjustments to the overhead louvers of a Alumatherm therma l heat treatment oven (Model Number 12, Serial Number DWG NO 3705-12) when the p latform gave way causing Employee #1 to fall 9 ft 6 in., into the empty quenchin g sump floor. Employee #1 suffered a retroperitoneal hematoma and multiple rib f ractures on the left side. Employee #1 was hospitalized.

Incident on Nov 5, 2004: Employee suffers amputated finger

Around 9:00 p.m. on November 5, 2004, Employee #1, an oven operator working for Bodycote Thermal Processing, was operating a CAT-30 forklift to remove metal par ts that were being heat-treated from an oven. The parts are placed in a basket i n the oven and at the end of the process the bucket is withdrawn from the oven o nto the elevated forks of the forklift. From a seated position in the forklift, Employee #1 was using a T-handle extension tool with a hook which allows the too l to connect to the basket and slide it out of the oven. The tool was placed alo ngside the outside of the mast and through the rear guard of the forklift. Emplo yee #1 accidentally shifted the forklift in reverse, causing his finger to be pi nched between the handle of the tool and the rear of the mast of the vehicle. Em ployee #1 suffered an amputated tip of his left index finger and was transported to a regional medical center for surgery. Employee #1 was a ten-year employee a ccustomed to performing duties of an oven operator. The investigation found that the accident was a consequence of the unsafe method used to remove buckets from the ovens. The State of California Code of Regulations, Title 8, does not conta in an applicable standard. AS a result, no violations were issued in relation to this accident.

Incident on May 11, 2004: Employee crushes index finger from falling object

On May 11, 2004, Employee #1 and a coworker were setting an 800-lb fixture into its placement of a table. They did not use a crane, other hoisting device, or to ol to move the fixture into place. As they were moving the fixture, it fell into the slots of the table, crushing the right index finger of Employee #1. He was taken to a medical center, where medical personnel amputated the injured portion of the finger. After the medical treatment, he underwent outpatient care.

Incident on Feb 7, 2003: Employee burned on hand and face by explosion

At approximately 6:00 a.m. on February 7, 2003, Employee #1 was working for Body cote Thermal Processing, a metal heat treating company that thermal processes me tal for use in aerospace. Employee #1, a heat-oven operator, was performing what is called a burn-out on a "BeaverMatic" oven, 18 in. by 48 in., which was built in 1967, Oven Number 5, preparing it for maintenance and a quality control surv ey. Employee #1 was standing in front of the oven and a coworker, a maintenance mechanic, was to the side of it. The burn-out procedures requires that the opera tor turns off the endothermic gas, open the inner and outer doors of the oven an d raise the temperature to 1800 degrees to burn off all the carbon and all the e ndothermic gas with the flame curtain on. Based on this investigation, Employee #1 did the follow burn-out procedures as directed. His actions were contrary to the employer's procedures. Employee #1 opened the outer door before all the endo thermic gas was burned off, did not have the inner door opened (during the entir e burn), did not have the flame curtain on, and did not have his face shield on. The unburned heated endothermic gas from the heat zone of the oven diffused out ward and mixed with air entering the oven when the outer door was opened which c aused an explosion. Employee #1 was burned by the explosion. He sustained second degree burns to his face and both hands and was hospitalized. Employee #1 did n ot recall if the flame curtain was on. There is some contradictory information r egarding when the inner oven door was opened and closed as well as when the endo thermic gas was turned off. Employee #1 said the inner door was closed during th e burn process but the Supervisor of the area reported that the inner door was o pened. However the supervisor is not certain of his report because after the acc ident he observed the inner door closed. The Supervisor indicated that the inner door could have been closed later after the accident. The Supervisor said there is a hole in the inner door where the flame could have come out even if the inn er door was closed. The General Manager of the company believed that Employee #1 : shut off the endothermic gas and opened the outer door with the flame curtain on while leaving the middle door closed; let the furnace sit for two hours to do the endothermic burn; then shut off the flame curtain and opened the inner door (outer door was open during the process). The injured employee in his interview indicated he was doing a burn out but this was inconsistent with his statement of just lowering the endothermic gas just prior to having Maintenance inspect th e oven.