Valero Refinery: OSHA inspections and violations

Incident on Feb 17, 2021 (fatal): Twelve employees are positive for covid-19 infection, one di

On February 17, 2021, an employee who worked as an Operating Engineer for a petroleum refinery died from COVID-19. The refinery had experienced an outbreak in the Utilities Work Station section. Eleven of the employee's coworkers, 10 Operating Engineers and 1 Production Supervisor, also tested positive for COVID-19. None of the other employees were hospitalized at the time the narrative was written. Information regarding engineering, administrative and personal protective equipment controls for COVID-19 are not included in the narrative.

Incident on Jul 17, 2013: Employee suffer burns when splashed with hot condensate

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on July 17, 2013, Employee #1 was assigned to drop th e bottom head on coke drum B for maintenance on the head alignment pins. Drum B had previously been cleaned and emptied and the head was reinstalled. It was dur ing that process that the flaw in the alignment pins was discovered. When Employ ee #1 and a coworker began the job, they noticed electricians working in the are a of the coke pit, where the coke drums would drain. The drum was empty, but Emp loyee #1 and the coworker were aware that there would be hot condensate in the d rum. Employee #1 and the coworkers, not wanting to disrupt the electricians, dec ided to drain drum #B by using an unwritten procedure only used when the drain l ines were plugged. This process would allow the hot condensate to drain on the d eck and not interfere with the electricians. Employee #1 began lowering the head on the bottom of drum #B using the hydraulic ram. The controller for the ram wo uld usually be on a 25 ft leash allowing the operator to be out of the danger zo ne. Employee #1 was operating the controller from directly under drum #B. The hy draulic ram moved slowly, placing a cheater bar on the control lever. The cowork er turned and walked away just as the hot condensate gushed out of the drum/head opening drenching Employee #1. The employee received 1st and 2nd degree burns t o his upper and lower back. Employee #1 was taken to an area hospital, where he was treated and remained hospitalized.

Incident on Dec 8, 2002: Employee gets burns when hot condensate gushes out

At 3:30 p.m. on December 8, 2002, an accident took place in Unit 44, the heavy o ils light ends recovery system, in a large oil refinery in Wilmington, Delaware. This unit used process of absorption and distillation to recover butane and pro pane from the sour overhead gas streams in the cooker unit and the vapor recover y unit. The accident took place at the bottom of 44-V-4004, a debutanizer that s eparated the butane and then the propane from the naphtha for further processing . 44-V-4004 was out of service and being steam cleaned for about 24 hours. Emplo yee #1, a chief operator, and a coworker went out to the approximately 120-ft-hi gh by 8-ft-round vessel to discuss the next phase of the cleaning process. Emplo yee #1 and the coworker blocked in a 2-in. valve venting steam to the Process De pressuring System (PDS) and broke the flange below a 4-in. valve, installing spr eader bars between the flanges. This piping configuration was approximately 6 ft above the deck. The steam to the tower was restarted and the valve above the sp reader bar flange was opened, steaming the vessel to the deck. At 3:30 p.m., Emp loyee #1 and the coworker went to the vessel and removed the steam and water. Em ployee #1 went to the spreader bar flange to verify that 44-V-4004 was empty. Em ployee #1 picked up a piece of a wire, Number 9, and probed between the spreader bar and the flange to dislodge any scale. As Employee #1 turned, a hot condensa te gushed out of the spread flange, knocking him to the ground. Employee #1 sust ained second-degree burns to the back, arms, and legs and was hospitalized.