Inspection 316425834 OPENED MAY 30, 2012Closed
Accident · Partial · Health · 136 employees at the site · Closed Oct 24, 2012
2720 Se 6th Ave, Portland, OR 97202 · Fluid Milk Manufacturing · OSHA's record · Phone and website on Google Maps
Incident on May 30, 2012: Truck driver sustains burns from inhaled chemicals
"The receiving dock attendant and nine other adjacently exposed workers were sen t to emergency rooms for evaluation and were released with only minor injuries. All others employees were unharmed." Employee #1 was the truck driver. He was wo rking for Univar USA. In addition to Employee #1, who was employed by Univar USA , ten other workers were injured in this incident. They were employees of Darigo ld. It is not known whether a 170 was generated for those workers. As it develop s, the employer in this 170 is given as Darigold, when the actual employer was U nivar USA. What should I do? == == == == Brief Description: There was a large ch lorine release due to pumping of acid into the wrong tank. Company Information: This Darigold facility was recently converted to a milk packaging plant only - n o ice cream. Consequently, they reduced their ammonia usage and are no longer a PSM covered process. Darigold purchases their sanitation chemicals through Ecola b. The chemicals are delivery by Univar USA which is a local chemical trucking c ompany. Accident Investigation: At approximately 10:15 a.m. on May 30, 2012, Emp loyee #1 was working as a truck driver for Univar USA. was making a routine deli very of sanitation chemicals to Darigold. These deliveries are made using milk-l oading dock #2 (second of two at the facility) and the chemicals are pumped thro ugh receiving pipes located on the south wall the loading dock. The pipes lead t o three large tanks located in the Clean In- Place (CIP) room located adjacent t o the dock. The multi-compartment tanker truck was loaded with two different che micals; AC-55-5 (nitric and phosphoric acid blend) and AC-103 (sodium hydroxide) . The sodium hydroxide was pumped first, without any problems. When Employee #1 hooked up the hose to pump the second delivery, which was acid, he selected the wrong intake pipe. He started pumping the acid into the "CIP Exelerate" sanitize r tank which contained sodium hypochlorite. The mixture started a reaction that generated chlorine gas. He could not see the tank in the CIP room, thus there wa s a delay in recognizing a problem. By the time the mix-up was identified, appro ximately 325 gallons of acid was mixed with approximately 1150 gallons of sodium hypochlorite. The Darigold dock attendant evacuated the area to safety. Employe e #1, the truck driver, donned a full face APR and shut-off the acid tanker. He then evacuated to safety. The entire milk plant was evacuated. Employee #1, the truck driver, was most severely injured and hospitalized overnight due to inhala tion burns. The receiving dock attendant and nine other adjacently exposed worke rs were sent to emergency rooms for evaluation and were released with only minor injuries. All others employees were unharmed. The chemical reaction continued t o generate chlorine until approximately 8:00P.M. that evening. The building and perimeter remained evacuated all evening and the chlorine was controlled by fans blowing into the room until the reaction was stopped and the tank was pumped ou t. Related Factors: Negative -A chlorine concentration above the IDLH (10 ppm) w as formed. The fire department's chlorine meter was pegged out (about measuring range). - Chemical truck deliveries tie up one of the two milk delivery docks. T here was an emphasis on limiting milk delivery interruptions, thus Employee #1 w as in a hurry to get the delivery done. -The milk receiving attendant at the Dar igold Dock was too busy to verify and watch the delivery. -The Bulk Delivery Rel ease Form (BDRF) was not signed by Darigold. -The locks were under the control o f Employee #1 - he had the combinations. -The lock combinations on the acid and hypochlorite locks were very similar (3264 for acid and 3266 for sodium hypochlo rite). Thus, they could have easily been interchanged. -The Ecolab safety proced ure was being used as the overriding standard for this operation. The "2 sets of eyes" unloading concept discussed multiple times in the Ecolab training was not followed. -Truck driver could not see both this truck and the receiving tank du ring the delivery, and the milk receiving attendant was not present (per the Eco lab procedure, both must be watched) -The milk receiving attendant was at the en d of his shift. (i.e. He was too busy to double check the delivery.) Positive -T he tanker truck was properly labeled. -The pipe hook-ups in the wall of the load dock were properly labeled and color coded. -The pipe hook-ups were locked. How ever the lock combinations were given to Employee #1. -Emergency evacuation was successful. -The CIP was unmanned at the time of the incident. == Here's the ori ginal narrative. It seems to me that the truck driver worked for Univar and that the dock attendant and his nine coworkers worked for Darigold. == Brief Descrip tion: There was a large chlorine release due to pumping of acid into the wrong t ank. Company Information: This Darigold facility was recently converted to a mil k packaging plant only - no ice cream. Consequently, they reduced their ammonia usage and are no longer a PSM covered process. Darigold purchases their sanitati on chemicals through Ecolab. The chemicals are delivery by Univar USA which is a local chemical trucking company. Accident Investigation: On May 30, 2012, at ap proximately 10:15 A.M., Univar USA was making a routine delivery of sanitation c hemicals to Darigold. These deliveries are made using milk-loading dock #2 (seco nd of two at the facility) and the chemicals are pumped through receiving pipes located on the south wall the loading dock. The pipes lead to three large tanks located in the Clean In- Place (CIP) room located adjacent to the dock. The mult i-compartment tanker truck was loaded with two different chemicals; AC-55-5 (nit ric and phosphoric acid blend) and AC-103 (sodium hydroxide). The sodium hydroxi de was pumped first, without any problems. When the truck driver hooked up the h ose to pump the second delivery, which was acid, he selected the wrong intake pi pe. He started pumping the acid into the "CIP Exelerate" sanitizer tank which co ntained sodium hypochlorite. The mixture started a reaction that generated chlor ine gas. He could not see the tank in the CIP room, thus there was a delay in re cognizing a problem. By the time the mix-up was identified, approximately 325 ga llons of acid was mixed with approximately 1150 gallons of sodium hypochlorite. The Darigold dock attendant evacuated the area to safety. The truck driver donne d a full face APR and shut-off the acid tanker. He then evacuated to safety. The entire milk plant was evacuated. The truck driver was most severely injured and hospitalized overnight due to inhalation burns. The receiving dock attendant an d nine other adjacently exposed workers were sent to emergency rooms for evaluat ion and were released with only minor injuries. All others employees were unharm ed. The chemical reaction continued to generate chlorine until approximately 8:0 0P.M. that evening. The building and perimeter remained evacuated all evening an d the chlorine was controlled by fans blowing into the room until the reaction w as stopped and the tank was pumped out. Related Factors: Negative -A chlorine co ncentration above the IDLH (10 ppm) was formed. The fire department'schlorine me ter was pegged out (about measuring range). - Chemical truck deliveries tie up o ne of the two milk delivery docks. There was an emphasis on limiting milk delive ry interruptions, thus the truck driver was in a hurry to get the delivery done. -The milk receiving attendant at the Darigold Dock was too busy to verify and w atch the delivery. -The Bulk Delivery Release Form (BDRF) was not signed by Dari gold. -The locks were under the control of the truck driver - he had the combina tions. -The lock combinations on the acid and hypochlorite locks were very simil ar (3264 for acid and 3266 for sodium hypochlorite). Thus, they could have easil y been interchanged. -The Ecolab safety procedure was being used as the overridi ng standard for this operation. The "2 sets of eyes" unloading concept discussed multiple times in the Ecolab training was not followed. -Truck driver could not see both this truck and the receiving tank during the delivery, and the milk re ceiving attendant was not present (per the Ecolab procedure, both must be watche d) -The milk receiving attendant was at the end of his shift. (i.e. He was too b usy to double check the delivery.) Positive -The tanker truck was properly label ed. -The pipe hook-ups in the wall of the load dock were properly labeled and co lor coded. -The pipe hook-ups were locked. However the lock combinations were gi ven to the truck driver. -Emergency evacuation was successful. -The CIP was unma nned at the time of the incident.