Frito Lay Inc: OSHA inspections and violations

Incident on Nov 27, 2008 (fatal): Employee is killed when caught between forklift and vehicle

At approximately 1:40 a.m. on or about November 27, 2008, Employee #1, a forklif t operator, had dismounted a manually operated forklift that he had used to retr ieve a pallet of product from space EEA02F. An automatically guided vehicle (AGV ), operating in the same area as Employee #1, turned a corner, failed to detect the manually operated forklift, and collided with it, striking Employee #1. Empl oyee #1 was caught between the AGV (HK Systems Model Number 35/LCF- 257Q, serial Number 4330050, Frito-Lay Unit Number 19) and his manually operated forklift (C ascade Side Shifter Number 55E-SS-A062, Truck Type E, Model Number RC3020-40-S, Serial Number 1A194660, Frito-Lay Unit Number 53). Employee #1's head was crushe d, and he was killed. The AGV's laser collision avoidance system did not sense t he presence of older type forklifts. The company required forklift operators to set a single plastic cone a distance from the manual forklift. The presence of t he cone was intended to increase the probability that the AGV's presence sensing field would detect the cone, causing the AGV to stop. Employee #1 had not set t he cone.

Incident on Feb 9, 2001 (fatal): Maintenance employee dies falling into storage tank

On February 9, 2001, Employee #1, a maintenance employee, died from asphyxia whe n he fell into oil storage tank. He reported to his supervisor a replacement flo at for the potato hold over tank could not be ordered from the tank manufacturer because the tank was not manufactured with the float. Employee #1 looked inside the tank and saw the float had two holes in it, causing it not to rise and fall with the level of oil in the tank. The tank measured six feet in diameter, nine feet tall, and the bottom twelve inches ran to a point. Employee #1 informed hi s supervisor that the float could be removed. His supervisor told Employee #1 th at the company would contract an outside company to retrieve the float, as it wa s in a company identified "permit-required confined space" and company policy th at specifies that NO employee is allowed to enter a permit required confined spa ce. Later in the evening, Employee #1 approached his supervisor with the float i n hand. His supervisor asked Employee #1 how he managed to retrieve the defectiv e float. Employee #1 stated not to worry about it and he had gotten the float ou t safely. Employee #1 showed his supervisor that the float only needed to have t he holes welded and the float could be replaced. His supervisor instructed Emplo yee #1 to wait until the following day before continuing with the project, as he wanted time to look into the situation. Sometime after his supervisor left the facility, Employee #1 took it upon himself to replace the float in the tank. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Employee #1 climbed a twelve foot step ladder and aske d another mechanic to turn off the nitrogen and hold the weight on the outside o f the tank so that the cables for the float would be at the top of the tank. Emp loyee #1 then opened the hatch of the tank and stuck his head inside the tank. T he tank hatch measured 15.125 inches by 12.25 inches. Somehow, Employee #1 fell inside the tank, which still had approximately two feet of oil still inside. The mechanic called for medical assistance immediately. The fire department respond ed within a few minutes and a fireman entered the tank, where Employee #1 was li fted out of the tank. Employee #1 was pronounced dead at 1:15 a.m. at UMC Hospit al.