Briggs & Stratton: OSHA inspections and violations

Incident on Sep 14, 1995 (fatal): Employee dies of overexertion and related heart condition

Employee #1, a pot man with miscellaneous duties in an aluminum die casting oper ation, was attempting to extinguish an incipient fire caused by an overflow of m olten aluminum at a die casting machine holding pot. The furnace and holding pot s are manufactured by Linberg/MPH, Riverside, MI. The three die casting machines are made by Lester with Walniak fronts. The automated die casting cycle functio ns in the following manner: An inclined conveyor feeds aluminum ingots up and in to an electric melt furnace. From the furnace, the metal flows by gravity into a n adjacent holding reservoir and then into a covered, heated trough, which in tu rn feeds three laterals to the three die casting machines. At each of the die ca sting machines is a holding pot of molten aluminum that is auto ladled into the die casting machines. The holding pots are equipped with adjustable float rod se nsors that govern the maximum and minimum levels in the melt furnace by controll ing the amount of conveyor feed into the furnace. On this day, float/sensor fail ure at the first die casting machine is suspected, as this is the lowest point o n the gravity-fed system. As a consequence, the conveyor failed to shut off and the high molten metal level in the furnace overflowed the holding pot at the fir st die casting machine, creating an incipient fire and setting off a ceiling spr inkler head. Employee #1 attempted to use an extinguisher. He fell over, lost co nsciousness which he never regained, and died on September 14, 1995. It was note d that the holding reservoir next to the furnace had the relief spout clogged wi th solidified aluminum, nullifying its intended function of preventing a higher than preset molten metal level by discharging excess metal into a crucible. The condition could have been averted had the holding reservoir relief spout not bee n circumvented from operating. Also, a more effective preventive maintenance pro gram is needed, as a bent float/sensor rod was discovered at the first die casti ng machine.

Incident on Aug 3, 1993: Eight employees burned in flash fire

At the start of an aluminum injection molding cycle, a hydraulic hose ruptured f or an unknown reason. The stream of atomized hydraulic fluid (flash point COC gr eater than 500 degrees F) was ignited by the molten aluminum in a transfer conta iner. The resulting flash fire burned Employees #1 through #9; Employees #1, #2, #3, #6, and #7 were hospitalized and a coworker was treated for shock. The hydr aulic fluid was within specifications for flash point. The working pressure of t he injection molding machine was below the designated working pressure of the ho se and, in addition, several over-pressure devices were present on the molding m achine to insure that an over-pressure condition would not occur. No external da mage was noted on the hose.